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ABSTRACT: This paper reviews the way in which Spanish agriculture climbed onto the pesticide treadmill. 
We claim that Fascist policies and expert advice assembled in the early 1940s accelerated the introduction of 
pesticides into Spanish agriculture and promoted the emergence of the Spanish pesticide industry in the times of 
autarky. Agricultural engineers were the key protagonists in this process, but other human and non-human actors 
also played a pivotal role: a new pest (the Colorado beetle), Francoist politicians, farmers, landowners and industry 
managers. Our focus is on the use of pesticides against the Colorado beetle (the main threat to the potato crop), and 
the transition from arsenical pesticides to DDT during the 1940s. We discuss how the politics of autarky offered 
new opportunities for developing agronomic programmes and the chemical industry and led to the creation of the 
Register of Pesticides in 1942. We also discuss the role of these regulations in concealing the risks of pesticides 
from farmers and food consumers. Arsenic pesticides became sources of slow poisoning and tools for social con-
trol while reinforcing the alliance of agricultural engineers and Fascist politicians in their autarkic and authoritar-
ian projects. When DDT arrived in Spain, the agricultural engineers praised the low toxicity it had demonstrated 
(compared to lead arsenate) in its first uses in public health and in military campaigns in Italy. Indeed, the data 
concerning its potential dangers disappeared from view thanks in part to a large multimedia campaign launched 
to promote the introduction of the new organic pesticides in Spanish agriculture, which is described at the end of 
the paper. 
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RESUMEN: Del arsénico al DDT: Plaguicidas, fascismo y la invisibilidad de los riesgos tóxicos en los primeros 
años de la España franquista (1939-1953). ‒ Este artículo revisa la forma en que la agricultura española entró en 
el círculo vicioso de los pesticidas. A principios de la década de 1940, la unión de políticas de inspiración fascista 
y el asesoramiento de expertos aceleraron la introducción de los pesticidas en la agricultura, y promovieron el sur-
gimiento de la industria española de pesticidas durante los años de la autarquía franquista. Los protagonistas clave 
en este proceso fueron los ingenieros agrícolas, pero también otros actores humanos y no humanos jugaron un 
papel fundamental: una nueva plaga (la del escarabajo de la patata), políticos franquistas, agricultores, propietarios 
de tierras y empresarios de la industria. El trabajo se centra en el uso de pesticidas contra el escarabajo de la patata 
(la principal amenaza para el cultivo de patata) y la transición del uso de pesticidas arsenicales al DDT durante la 
década de 1940. La política de la autarquía ofreció nuevas oportunidades para desarrollar programas agronómicos 
y la industria química y condujo a la creación del Registro de plaguicidas en 1942. También se revisa el papel 
de estas regulaciones para ocultar los riesgos de los plaguicidas a agricultores y consumidores. Los pesticidas 
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con arsénico se convirtieron en fuentes de envenenamiento lento y herramientas para el control social al tiempo que reforzaron la 
alianza de ingenieros agrícolas y políticos fascistas en sus proyectos autárquicos y autoritarios. Cuando el DDT llegó a España, los 
ingenieros agrícolas elogiaron la baja toxicidad que había demostrado (en comparación con el arseniato de plomo) en sus primeros 
usos en salud pública y en campañas militares en Italia. De hecho, los datos sobre sus peligros potenciales apenas tuvieron visibili-
dad, gracias en parte a una gran campaña multimedia lanzada para promover la introducción de los nuevos pesticidas orgánicos en 
la agricultura española, la cual se describe al final del artículo.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Plaguicidas; DDT; Lindano; Escarabajo de la patata; Control de plagas; Régimen franquista; Ingenieros 
agrónomos; Riesgos tóxicos.
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tural engineers were key protagonists in this process, but 
other human and non-human actors also played a pivotal 
role: the Colorado beetle, Francoist politicians, farmers, 
and landowners (Bertomeu Sánchez, 2019b). 
We start with a brief review of the historiographical 
issues raised by pesticides in the early twentieth-century 
Spain. We then explore the challenges created by the ar-
rival of the Colorado beetle in the late 1930s. We provide 
a collective portrayal of the community of agricultural 
engineers and their role in the early years of the Franco 
regime. We discuss how the politics of autarky offered 
new opportunities for developing agronomic programmes 
for pest control and the agrochemical industry. We also 
describe the first important regulation on pesticides, the 
National Register created in 1942, and draw on this source 
to review the main producers of DDT and other related 
pesticides in Spain during the 1940s. We then present an 
overview of the new discursive practices promoting the 
use of DDT in academic studies, in publications aimed 
at the farming industry, and in advertisements in newspa-
pers. We highlight both features that reflect a continuity 
with earlier discourses (for example, military metaphors, 
patriotic sentiment, economic profit) and new trends con-
necting organochlorine pesticides with safety, health, sci-
entific progress and national pride. The new organochlo-
rine pesticides were introduced in Spain in the mid-1940s 
at a time when the Franco regime was implementing new 
domestic and international policies in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, and when the potential role in post-
war society of wartime innovations such as DDT and pen-
icillin was becoming clear. 
Our claim is that Francoist policies and expert advice 
assembled in the early 1940s accelerated the introduc-
tion of arsenical pesticides in Spanish agriculture and the 
emergence of the Spanish pesticide industry. Arsenical 
pesticides paved the way for the arrival of new products 
such as DDT and mapped out Spain’s later route towards 
what Robert van den Bosch called the “pesticide tread-
mill”—that is, the marginalization of other forms of pest 
control and the creation of new balances between short-
term profits and long-term human and environmental 
costs (Bosch, 1989; Murray, 1994; Wright, 2005). 
Unlike arsenical pesticides, DDT was a new organ-
ic product associated with the successful wartime cam-
paigns against typhus and malaria. Unlike arsenic, DDT 
INTRODUCTION
Pesticides have been applied for centuries, but sever-
al factors encouraged a more intensive usage during the 
twentieth century: the international trade of seeds and 
crops, the expansion of monoculture, and the new motor-
ized transports. At the turn of the twentieth century, ar-
senic compounds were commonly used in many parts of 
the world, and since the end of the Second World War, 
synthetic pesticides have been essential elements of the 
intensification of agriculture and the so-called “Green 
Revolution”; they have created new interconnections be-
tween capital, labour, materials, transportation networks, 
food markets and expert knowledge. As with other pol-
lutants, the advent of new pesticides ushered in a new, 
unequal distribution of human and environmental hazards 
which depended on their material features, their degree 
of toxicity and their wide range of uses in different so-
cial and cultural contexts. The circulation of the new 
pesticides also created narratives and discursive practices 
which were embedded in these conflicts. This last point 
is the main focus of this paper, which deals with the in-
troduction of DDT in Spain during the first decade of the 
Francoist dictatorship. 
We understand pesticides as sociomaterial products 
which have both a material and a political dimension.1 The 
early decades of the Franco regime provide an excellent 
context for exploring these features. Before the 1940s, ag-
ricultural engineers frequently lamented the limited use 
of agrochemicals in Spain. Along with the irrigation prob-
lems and the lack of investment in machinery, the issue 
was regarded as one of the reasons for the low produc-
tivity in Spanish agriculture. The first years of the Franco 
regime were marked by an intensive use of pesticides and 
the creation of new regulations for encouraging the lo-
cal pesticide industry, along with campaigns promoting 
the use of the new agrochemicals. In previous work, we 
have explored the early history of pesticides before the 
arrival of DDT, notably the arsenical compounds which 
were widely used in agriculture during the first half of 
the twentieth century. We have explored their role in the 
emergence of the early Spanish pesticide industry, thanks 
to the modernizing projects designed by agricultural en-
gineers and the autarkic policies of the early Francoist 
years. As in other examples studied by historians, agricul-
Culture & History Digital Journal 10(1), June 2021, e004. eISSN 2253-797X, doi: https://doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2021.004
From arsenic to DDT: Pesticides, Fascism and the invisibility of toxic risks in the early years of Francoist Spain (1939-1953) • 3
was not associated with cases of poisoning or accidents, 
so the new product was promoted as a “safe” alternative 
to the old pesticides which had been so rapidly introduced 
during the early 1940s. The new product was used in pub-
lic health campaigns against malaria and typhus, in ag-
riculture against pests such as the Colorado beetle, and 
in household cleaning and spraying against insects. So 
DDT was presented as a miraculous chemical discovered 
in wartime which could enhance crop productivity, create 
economic profit, improve human health, and increase do-
mestic comfort. The focus in this paper is on its first uses 
in agriculture, particularly in the campaigns against the 
Colorado beetle, in which arsenical pesticides had been 
previously used. In later papers, we plan to discuss the 
changing processes of visibilization/invisibilization of 
toxic hazards in other settings: the food market, public 
health, and the environment. Our aim is to discuss issues 
related to the practices of agnotology and undone science, 
along with role of pesticides and pest control in author-
itarian regimes such as the Franco dictatorship (Proctor 
and Schiebinger, 2008; Frickel et al., 2010; Boudia and 
Jas, 2014; Henry, 2017; Boudia et al., 2018).
AGRICULTURE, SCIENCE AND FASCISM
Early twentieth-century Spanish agriculture has been 
described by historians as backward and unproductive, in 
part due to the limited use of machinery and agrochemi-
cals.2 Recent research in the history of Spanish agricul-
ture has challenged these received views by taking into 
account a broad range of issues, including environmental 
constraints, regulatory frameworks, additional historical 
actors, social decision-making processes, and the region-
al variations which shaped the introduction of new seeds, 
technologies and practices in the Iberian Peninsula.3 To-
day, many historians agree that substantial technological 
changes were introduced in Spanish agriculture during the 
first decades of the twentieth century. However, the first 
decade of the Franco regime is still regarded as “the years 
of delay” or a period of “decline”. Lourenzo Fernández 
has described these years as the “Francoist technological 
black out” (“apagón tecnológico del franquismo”). He 
claims that the Civil War and the brutal repression that 
ensued led to the destruction of the economic, social and 
institutional bases which had prompted agriculture inno-
vations during the previous three decades. New institu-
tions set up in the early 1940s, such as the Instituto Na-
cional de Investigaciones Agrarias (INIA), were attempts 
to establish a more centralized network of experimental 
stations and provincial agronomic offices, while consign-
ing earlier projects to oblivion. According to Fernández, 
the new campaigns for improving agrarian technology 
were marked by more authoritarian practices, the margin-
alization of peasants and a renewed role for landowners 
as the main beneficiaries of the projects. The result was 
two decades of “black out” (apagón) which put an end 
to the early twentieth-century technological developments 
in agriculture or delayed their implementation until the 
1960s, when new economic policies were implemented in 
Spain and the Green Revolution was adopted (Fernández 
Prieto and Pujol, 2001; Fernández Prieto, 2007).
While serving as an inspiration for new studies, this 
framework has been revisited in some sense by recent 
research on science, agriculture and fascism, particularly 
by the studies on the importance of science and technol-
ogy in the making of the early Francoist regime. Histori-
ans of agriculture have shown that the agricultural sector 
played a primary role in different Fascist (or Fascistized) 
regimes from the point of view of the policies of autarky 
(self-sufficiency and national independence from external 
markets) and the strong ruralist discourse at the ideologi-
cal level, in which the peasantry and the countryside were 
conceived as the bearers of crucial cultural, demographic 
and social values for the nation.4 Well-known examples 
of these campaigns are the Battaglia di Grano (the Battle 
for Grain) in Fascist Italy or the breeding programmes for 
producing pigs in Nazi Germany (Bonneuil and Thomas, 
2010; Saraiva and Wise, 2010; Saraiva, 2016). 
Recent studies have also offered a renewed picture of 
the role of science and technology under Franco, high-
lighting the relevance of important projects in irrigation, 
agriculture or construction materials in the making of 
the authoritarian regime. The policy of autarky played 
an important role both as a Fascist ideological goal (i.e., 
self-sufficiency) and as a response to the specific econom-
ic situation (i.e., Spain’s commercial isolation) caused by 
the shortage of imported raw materials. Many Francoist 
politicians were persuaded that self-sufficiency could 
only be obtained by means of a centralized authoritarian 
system able to enforce more effective practices in agri-
culture, while encouraging the intensive exploitation of 
national resources and an accelerated development of na-
tional industry.5
AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERS AND THE EARLY 
FRANCO REGIME
As in other similar regimes, agricultural engineers 
played a major role in the developments just mentioned. 
After the emergence of their profession in the nineteenth 
century, by around 1930 Spanish agricultural engineers 
had established their position as key actors in the coun-
try’s development, playing an important role in the Na-
tional Institute for Agronomic Research and in many 
research field stations and dominating a large network 
of provincial agricultural sections. By the mid-1930s, 
around 400 agricultural engineers held leading positions 
the government hierarchy: apart from pest control, they 
tested new fertilizers, performed experiments on plant 
breeding, introduced new seeds and promoted new ma-
chinery in agriculture. They regarded these issues as the 
key ingredients for the “modernization” of Spanish agri-
culture (Pan-Montojo, 2005).
During the 1920s and 1930s, agricultural engineers 
worked together with forest experts and entomologists 
from the Museum of Natural History in various areas of 
pest control. In 1935 an international meeting on ento-
mology was held in Madrid, in which papers on biologi-
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cal and chemical methods of pest control were discussed. 
The Civil War and the brutal repression that followed 
affected the communities dealing with pest control in 
very different ways.6 While famous entomologists such 
as Cándido Bolivar were forced into exile, most of the 
agricultural engineers remained in Spain and were able 
to pursue successful careers in the public sector. Many of 
them celebrated the end of the Republic and cooperated 
enthusiastically with the new regime. Indeed, two agri-
culture ministers in early Francoist governments, Carlos 
Rein Segura and Rafael Cavestany, were agricultural en-
gineers, while the head of the service of agriculture, Ma-
nuel Goytia Angulo, was a leading member of both the 
Falange and the Spanish parliament. As stated above, the 
reform of the National Institute of Agronomic Research in 
early 1940 established a large, centralized network under 
the control of agricultural engineers, comprising exper-
imental farms, phytopathological stations, horticultural 
centres, agro-chemistry laboratories and research stations 
(Fernández Prieto, 2007).
Like other “Franco engineers”, agricultural engineers 
had many opportunities to develop their modernization 
projects in Spanish agriculture.7 At the same time, they 
helped to bolster the new authoritarian regime thanks to 
the expert advice they provided in irrigation, transporta-
tion and agriculture. The marginalization of other groups 
such as the entomologists of the Museum of Natural Histo-
ry paved the way for the increased use of pesticides at the 
expense of other forms of pest control. And these trends 
were exacerbated by the arrival of a non-human protago-
nist: the Colorado beetle, which posed a major threat to 
potato yields, one of Spain’s most important crops.8
LEAD ARSENATE AND THE COLORADO BEE-
TLE 
Lead arsenate had already been applied against a va-
riety of pests during the early twentieth century, but its 
use remained limited until the 1940s, when the Colorado 
beetle arrived in the Iberian Peninsula. The first case was 
detected in northern Catalonia, near the Pyrenees, dur-
ing the summer of 1935. It was contained during the first 
years but the Civil War dramatically reduced the human 
and material resources for pest control and the Colorado 
beetle spread southwards, and its presence was declared a 
“public calamity” in the summer of 1940.9
With the help of the political authorities, agricultural 
engineers carried out a large-scale campaign against the 
Colorado beetle. The Servicio de Defensa Sanitaria del 
Cultivo de la Patata was set up in 1940 under the super-
vision of the agricultural engineer Agustín Alfaro More-
no (Bajo Mateos, 1946). The new service coordinated an 
extended network of agriculture offices and laboratories 
created during the previous decades. The campaigns in-
cluded talks, practical courses, leaflets, articles in newspa-
pers, radio broadcasts and even documentary films. Ser-
vices of surveillance were established to detect new foci, 
and pesticides and spraying equipment were distributed 
either free or at low prices. The campaigns reinforced the 
use of pesticides and at the same time extended the state’s 
control over farmers’ lives, thanks to the efforts of the 
provincial network of agricultural engineers (Bertomeu 
Sánchez, 2020).
As agronomic research provided new ways to man-
age rural areas, the Franco regime offered new opportu-
nities for agricultural engineers in pest control activities. 
Apart from the examples mentioned, further regulations 
were published by the Department of Agriculture in 1944. 
Landowners, farmworkers, agricultural engineers, munic-
ipal authorities and even the Guardia Civil were instruct-
ed to carefully survey potato fields and report any trace of 
the pest as soon as possible. Penalties were imposed on 
farmers who did not report the pest or did not follow the 
procedures stipulated.10 
In the pest control campaigns, the agriculture engi-
neers worked together with the “Hermandades de Lab-
radores y Ganaderos”, a sort of Falangist peasant trade 
union. The union provided spraying equipment and pes-
ticides at low cost or for free and promoted their use in 
Spanish agriculture. In June 1945, during a large political 
meeting of the Falange in Madrid attended by leading fig-
ures in the regime, members of the Hermandades were 
provided with “200 sprayers in order to combat potato 
beetles” under the supervision of agriculture engineers. 
They marched proudly, with sprayers in their backs, while 
singing Fascist anthems.11
When agrochemical propaganda and Fascist parades 
were not enough, the regime resorted to political terror and 
ruthless repression. For instance, in Burgos, in the knowl-
edge that many farmers had not followed the guidelines 
in previous campaigns, the Gobernador Civil published 
orders in newspapers announcing that all infringers would 
be punished most severely, including village mayors who 
failed to report their fellow farmers. He announced that 
they would be interned in “concentration camps”, their 
crops confiscated by the government, and their lands of-
fered to other more obedient country folk.12 
Farmers who were reluctant to use arsenical pesticides 
were subjected to propaganda campaigns, and in the worst 
cases to terror and repression. Many of them had grave 
doubts about the effectiveness of these treatments, the 
costs involved in terms of chemicals, apparatus and la-
bour and the danger to cattle, in particular on small farms. 
Hunters were also indignant at the effects of arsenates on 
wild fauna and some protests were published in newspa-
pers. Moreover, arsenate pesticides were also associated 
with the horrifying images of accidental or criminal poi-
soning cases which were becoming more common due to 
the growing presence of these products in rural life (Ber-
tomeu-Sánchez, 2019b).
THE EARLY YEARS OF DDT IN SPAIN
This, then, was the background to the introduction of 
DDT in Spain. In the early 1940s, arsenical pesticides 
were extensively used. DDT had been synthesized many 
decades before, but its properties as a pesticide only be-
came known during the Second World War, thanks to the 
Culture & History Digital Journal 10(1), June 2021, e004. eISSN 2253-797X, doi: https://doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2021.004
From arsenic to DDT: Pesticides, Fascism and the invisibility of toxic risks in the early years of Francoist Spain (1939-1953) • 5
research performed by Paul Müller at the Geigy laborato-
ries in Switzerland (Jarman and Ballschmiter, 2012; Si-
mon, 1999; Straumann, 2005). DDT was first used in mil-
itary campaigns in Italy, against vector insects producing 
typhus and malaria. With the support of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, DDT was adopted in both public health and 
agriculture in many countries in Latin America and Eu-
rope in the mid-1940s (Fitzgerald, 1986; Stapleton, 1998; 
Palmieri, 2010). Lead arsenate had been used for similar 
purposes in the previous decade, but the chemical and tox-
icological properties of the new organochlorine chemicals 
opened up new possibilities as they did not appear to be 
dangerous to cattle, humans or crops. 
Thanks to public health and military campaigns, along 
with its apparent absence of acute toxicity in operating 
doses, DDT came to represent the triumph of modern 
technology over pests and disease. Its positive image was 
projected in agronomic papers and public health leaflets 
and in industry advertisements, and its use was actively 
promoted in urban health campaigns, military barracks, 
schools, food stores and domestic spaces in general. The 
advent of DDT also fed the technocrats’ dream of con-
trolling nature (both pests and illnesses) by means of 
non-dangerous chemicals: so much so, in fact, that the 
use of other synthetic pesticides was enthusiastically 
embraced, and other forms of pest control systematical-
ly marginalized. The early critical voices, and the calls 
for caution, were silenced (Mart, 2015). The mass use of 
DDT in public health eclipsed all other approaches to epi-
demics, monopolizing the attention and reducing funding 
for crucial areas in tropical medicine and microbiology 
(Clarke, 2012).
In spite of this positive image, the new organochlo-
ride pesticides were not universally welcomed, even if the 
dissenting voices remained silenced for decades. Many 
toxicological studies of DDT carried out soon after its in-
troduction in the 1940s offered experimental evidence of 
its potential danger to mammals. The dominant narrative 
that still persists in popular accounts and even in academ-
ic circles is that the risks of pesticides were barely known 
until the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 
1962.13 In fact, many years before Silent Spring, public 
health experts had advocated caution regarding crude in-
secticide-based eradication methods, stressing the com-
plex interaction between chemicals, insects, diseases, hu-
mans and the environment. Similar criticisms were raised 
by entomologists and agricultural engineers, particularly 
when the reports of disastrous experiences in cotton fields 
in Latin America in the 1950s provided growing evidence 
of insect resistance to pesticides (Murray, 1994, pp. 32-
37). Not only public health and entomology researchers 
were sceptical about the innocuous nature of the new pes-
ticides: other groups such as beekeepers and hunters soon 
realized the damage caused by pesticides to beneficial in-
sects and wild life in general (Anderson and Atkins, 1968; 
Suryanarayanan and Kleinman, 2017; Frøyen, 2019). To 
allay these fears, large amounts were invested in public 
campaigns extolling the virtues of DDT as a safe chem-
ical, suitable for use in fields, in homes or in hospitals 
(Conis, 2010, 2017); even so, many farmers relied on al-
ternative methods of pest control for decades, either due 
to their proven efficiency or for economic reasons (Gay, 
2012; Bertomeu Sánchez, 2019a).
While bearing in mind the general trends mentioned, 
it goes without saying that the history of DDT varies sub-
stantially in the diverse contexts in which it was applied. 
Like other pesticides with both material and political di-
mensions, DDT was adopted in different ways accord-
ing to the different social, cultural, economic and polit-
ical contexts, the different protagonists involved in this 
process (industry, farmers, householders, agronomy and 
public health experts), and the agroecological and sani-
tary conditions (main crops, pests, and epidemics) (Rieg-
ert, 1980; Dunlap, 1981; Carter, 2008; Fernández Bravo, 
2018; Bertomeu Sánchez, 2019a). 
In Spain, many of these issues are still to be analysed 
from a historical perspective, but some preliminary fea-
tures can be gathered from a study of the available litera-
ture.14 The new organochlorine pesticides were known in 
Spain in the early 1940s – initially only in reduced cir-
cles, mostly experts in agriculture engineering and public 
health. In a document written in December 1941, Geigy 
industries announced that everything was in place for the 
exportation of “Gesarol” (their trademark for DDT) to 
countries such as Holland, Belgium, Portugal, Turkey and 
Spain (Straumann, 2005, p. 236). One of the first agri-
culture engineers who performed experiments with these 
products was Alfaro Moreno, the director of the cam-
paigns against the Colorado beetle, who claimed that he 
had been dealing with the new organochlorine products 
since 1942. Two years later he reported his experiments 
and compared the new products to lead arsenate, the prod-
uct he had recommended until then in the fight against the 
beetle pest. He affirmed that the effects were “similar” in 
insects, but he acknowledged that DDT seemed to be less 
toxic than arsenic for mammals. The main problem was 
its high price in comparison to previous pesticides.15
Alfaro performed a large number of laboratory and 
field experiments to test the great variability of the ef-
fects of pesticides. He noted the differences in the con-
centration of active isomers in the commercial samples. 
Since the summer of 1943, another agriculture engineer, 
Miguel Benlloch, had performed “more than a hundred” 
experiments with new organochloride pesticides (DDT 
and HCH) at the Madrid Phytopathological Station, in 
which he affirmed that new mixtures of isomers had been 
developed.16 He concluded that the new pesticides had 
very promising properties, particularly their stability and 
their action by contact, but warned against excessive op-
timism regarding their usefulness and harmlessness. He 
mentioned several cases in which DDT had already been 
shown to be inefficient against certain pests and he re-
marked that the spectrum of action remained unknown, 
and so there was a serious risk that it might damage bene-
ficial insects. Moreover, Benlloch warned against making 
excessive claims regarding the lack of toxicity of DDT in 
mammals, stressing that many aspects of the toxicology 
of organochlorine pesticides were still to be established 
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(“todavía hay mucho que investigar”). Reviewing the 
available data on toxic effects on humans, he nevertheless 
accepted that the current experience at the doses used in 
agriculture suggested that they were innocuous (Benlloch, 
1945a) and in May 1945 he was already recommending 
the use of DDT against many different agriculture pests 
in answer to questions addressed by farmers (Benlloch, 
1945c).
Apart from their doubts about efficiency and safety, 
the main concern of agricultural engineers in the early 
years of the use of DDT was quality control and fraud. 
Benlloch, who was in charge of one of the main pesti-
cide quality control laboratories, highlighted this issue as 
the main problem facing the expansion of the use of the 
new organochlorine pesticides. The available commercial 
products seemed to have very different insecticidal ef-
fects, and the chemical methods for controlling the quality 
of these complex mixtures of organic isomers were unre-
liable. In 1944, the director of agronomic services in Bar-
celona requested chemical analyses of samples of DDT-
based pesticides due to their increasing use in agriculture 
(Quintana Marí, 1944; Quintana Marí and Cid Capella, 
1946). In addition to the complex mixtures of isomers, 
Benlloch soon realized that the efficacy of organic pes-
ticides depended on many other different issues: for in-
stance, the differences in the quality of pesticide suspen-
sions in water, which might be created without sufficient 
care by unskilled farmers trying to follow the guidelines 
provided by the industry. Other crucial pesticidal effects 
largely depended on issues such as the insects involved, 
temperature, humidity, soil, and so on which were com-
plex, changeable, and difficult to control in laboratory ex-
periments (Benlloch, 1945d).
The precautionary tone in the reports by Alfaro and 
Benlloch is also found in the first references to DDT in 
journals such as Agricultura, edited and written by ag-
ricultural engineers but addressed to a broad readership 
of landowners and farmers. The first references to DDT 
appeared in mid-1944, when the product was already be-
ing used in the fields. These early publications included 
reports on the extraordinary virtues of the new pesticides 
but also made calls for prudence and for further research 
and experimentation before the final adoption of the new 
products. In May 1944, a report published in Agricultu-
ra described several new pesticides, leading the trend to 
replace arsenic products by less dangerous products to 
humans and cattle. DDT (“Gesarol”) was the most impor-
tant one, and was supported by “an intensive propagan-
da” campaign that had been launched during the previous 
months. The anonymous author noted that its pesticidal 
power was similar to arsenates but its price was “more 
than twice (as high)”, which limited its use in high-pro-
ductivity crops. The author also warned against excessive-
ly optimistic views regarding DDT as a “panacea” against 
all pests, because it had been shown to be inefficient for 
killing certain insects.17 Another paper published in the 
following months decried the overenthusiasm regard-
ing the “excellent qualities” of DDT and warned against 
the rush to use large quantities of DDT in some areas in 
Spain. The anonymous writer noted the diverse value of 
the commercial products, the difficulties of using chem-
ical analysis in quality control and the potential risks to 
human health, even mentioning the tragedy of other pes-
ticides such as Naaki, a finely ground quartz dust which 
had been introduced in the 1930s but banned when it was 
shown to cause silicosis in farmers.18
Along with its early uses in agriculture, DDT was 
adopted in public health campaigns against typhus and 
malaria. While malaria was a chronic disease in some 
parts of Spain, typhus epidemics were a consequence of 
the poor nutritional status of the population and low lev-
els of hygiene in the early 1940s (Estellés Salarich, 1944; 
Jiménez Lucena, 1994; Rodríguez Ocaña, 2017). Exper-
iments with DDT were performed in a number of sites 
affected by these epidemics. For instance, under the su-
pervision of the medical and political authorities in Valen-
cia, a medical commission performed several experiments 
with people and clothes infested by lice using DDT sam-
ples obtained in high street shops. The doctor who wrote 
the report concluded that DDT was not as potent as cya-
nide fumigations and wondered whether the commercial 
products in Valencia were in fact less effective than the 
ones used in Naples by the US army during the fumiga-
tion against the typhus epidemic in 1943 (Vidal Jordana, 
1943; Vidal Jordana and Rodríguez Fornos, 1946).19 
The most important work with DDT was carried 
out in the context of malaria campaigns, which were a 
major medical problem in many areas. Special commis-
sions had been established in the preceding years and 
several medical measures had been implemented, along 
with the use of Paris green and other arsenical pesticides 
against Anopheles mosquitoes (Rodríguez Ocaña et al., 
2003; Rodríguez Ocaña, 2005). Many doctors became 
interested in organochlorine pesticides after the Sardinia 
campaign in Italy in 1944, among them the military doc-
tor Piédrola who published several books summarizing 
recent research on medical uses of DDT (Piédrola Gil, 
1945, 1948a, 1948b; Piédrola Gil and Matilla Gómez, 
1947). He also wrote on the fumigation of military bar-
racks (Piédrola Gil, 1950). 
While agricultural engineers and public health doc-
tors were still studying the new products and performing 
field and hospital experiments, newspapers and agricul-
ture magazines had been carrying articles on DDT since 
the end of the Second World War. This was also the case 
in other countries (Gaissler, 2015, pp. 70-75). Advertise-
ments were published not just by the Swiss producers, but 
also by a wide range of Spanish companies, from pharma-
ceutical and chemical industries to small producers and 
retailers who were interested in the profits accruing from 
the demand for the new pesticides in agriculture, public 
health and the home. Thus, the new organochlorine pes-
ticides produced a sudden and unexpected change in the 
Spanish pesticide industry, which had been created in the 
early 1940s to produce and exploit arsenical compounds 
with the support of the policies of autarky and the pest 
control programmes developed by agriculture engineers.
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CHANGES IN THE EARLY PESTICIDE INDUS-
TRY 
So the arrival of DDT in Spain practically coincided 
with the mass introduction of arsenical pesticides against 
the Colorado beetle pest and the establishment of an in-
cipient Spanish pesticide industry based on these prod-
ucts, using national mineral resources and supported by 
the politics of autarky. The increasing demand for pesti-
cides, along with the crisis in imported products during 
the early 1940s, produced a black market of adulterated 
products which raised alarm among agriculture engineers. 
In 1940, just a few months after the end of the Civil War, 
agricultural engineers managed to set up a permanent pro-
gramme for the “inspection of the production and com-
merce of insecticides”.20 Two years later, the National 
Register for Phytosanitary Products was created, shortly 
before the establishment of a similar service in Vichy 
France. The priorities of the Spanish National Register, 
like those of its French counterpart, were the promotion of 
intensive agricultural production and the development of 
the pesticide industry, rather than any public health con-
cerns.21 The register aimed to encourage national produc-
tion (a separate procedure was created for imported pesti-
cides, with stricter requirements) as well as to prevent the 
trading of faulty products and adulterations. In fact, most 
of the applications for trading pesticides submitted during 
the first months of 1943 were made by local industries, 
most of them producing arsenic pesticides.22
The register was created at the end of 1942, almost at 
the same time as the first news of the pesticidal virtues 
of DDT arrived in Spain. During the next year, the first 
imported samples of Gesarol soon sold out and its price 
skyrocketed. The producers of arsenic pesticides, whose 
local production had been substantially increased for the 
reasons mentioned, took fright; with the help of the new 
regulations, they managed to delay the importation of new 
organochloride compounds.23 By the early 1950s, around 
a thousand pesticides produced by Spanish industry had 
been submitted, but only a hundred from abroad.24 The 
applications frequently highlighted that they were com-
prised only “national products”. Foreign industries were 
included in a separate register with stricter requirements. 
Samples of the pesticides, along with description of the 
manufacturer, were sent to the Provincial Agriculture 
Offices, whose directors wrote a preliminary report (fo-
cusing in particular on the activities of the producers and 
their capacity for making large amounts of pesticides). 
The product was sent for analysis to the laboratory run by 
Miguel Benlloch, head of the Madrid Phytopathological 
Station. He reported the effects of the pesticide, the ex-
istence of similar products (thus avoiding resale) and the 
absence of damaging effects for the plants. More than 900 
products were analysed by Benlloch between 1943 and 
1950.25 Many of the proposals were rejected: more than a 
quarter were turned down during the first decade. Around 
six hundred pesticides were admitted by the end of 1952, 
while a hundred more (most of them foreign products) 
were “provisionally accepted”.26 
As stated above, during the early years most of the 
registered pesticides were arsenical insecticides such as 
lead and calcium arsenate. In 1943, thanks to increasing 
demand, the difficulty in importing products, and the high 
market prices of the pesticides, a large number of local 
industries attempted to produce DDT and similar organo-
chlorine products. According to an anonymous professor 
of chemistry, around 30 chemists were working in differ-
ent laboratories in the synthesis of DDT and, by the end 
of 1944, at least “six Spanish industries” had succeeded 
in producing it. Within a few months, there were eleven 
firms manufacturing DDT in Spain. But the laboratories’ 
desire for a rapid return on their investment meant that the 
quality of the product suffered. The career of many of the 
local firms as DDT producers was short-lived: they never 
had the laboratory resources or the manpower required to 
make high quality organic pesticides.27
The impact of DDT in the emerging Spanish pesticide 
industry can also be traced in the register of pesticides. 
The first group of authorized products (around 60) were 
almost all arsenical compounds (Paris green, sodium, 
calcium or lead arsenate, among others). In the register, 
the first organochlorine pesticide authorized was “ZZ”, a 
product made by an up-and-coming pharmaceutical com-
pany, Zeltia, which was also one of the first companies 
to advertise DDT in journals such as Agricultura.28 An-
other pioneering producer was another pharmaceutical 
industry, the Fábrica Española de Productos Químicos 
y Farmacéuticos in Bilbao, which produced “Detano”, a 
mixture presented as the “true and real DDT”, obtained 
following the firm’s own method.29 Other important in-
dustries producing DDT in the mid-1940s were Sociedad 
Anónima Cros, a producer of fertilizers and connected in 
earlier years to the German firm IG Farben; Fabricación 
de Colorantes y Explosivos, a chemical industry in Bar-
celona which also commercialized several organochlorine 
pesticides under the trademark “Inu Agrícola”30; and Cruz 
Verde, a firm also based in Barcelona area which manu-
factured and sold a broad range of pesticides for agricul-
tural and domestic uses.31 Other early producers of DDT 
were small local firms such as José Escorihuela Perelló, 
Francisco Villanova Ibañez, and José Ramón Rivelles 
Talón, most probably small retailers of agrochemicals in 
the Valencia area.32
The number of foreign industries was small, for the 
reasons mentioned above. An exception was Geigy indus-
tries, the first producer of DDT, which managed to estab-
lish a branch office named Irga in Barcelona and obtained 
the first authorization to sell “Gesarol”, the DDT mixture 
designed for agriculture. It was followed by products cre-
ated for other uses such as controlling parasites in cattle 
and killing insects. Many advertisements for these prod-
ucts were published from mid-1945 onwards in local and 
national newspapers and in farming journals.33 
After 1945, an increasing number of organochlorine 
products were registered, around two thirds of them made 
of different mixtures of DDT. Other important products 
were hexachlorocyclohexane (HCH) and its gamma-iso-
mer (lindane).34 By the end of 1952 organochlorine com-
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pounds had established themselves as the most important 
group, accounting for around a third of all insecticides 
and almost doubling the number of arsenate compounds. 
The other important group of insecticides were mineral 
oils and products of plant origin, mostly from nicotine. 
Apart from insecticides, the other important group in the 
register were the fungicides made of copper salts (Bor-
deaux mixture) or sulphur.35
Arsenical pesticides were progressively replaced by 
DDT, but they continued to be used in the fields for many 
years. At the end of the 1950s, for example, in a popular 
radio magazine addressed to farmers, the two pesticides 
recommended by agricultural engineers against the Colo-
rado beetle were lead arsenate and DDT mixtures (Radio 
Agrícola, 1959). Apart from arsenates, DDT pesticides 
co-existed and competed with other new organic pesti-
cides which were introduced in the mid-1940s. One of 
most important in agriculture and public health was HCH 
(or “666”), which was heralded as a Spanish discovery 
and attributed to Juan Gomeza, a pharmaceutical chem-
ist working at Insecticidas Cóndor SA, one of the main 
producers of pesticides in the 1940s. In fact, the molecule 
had been synthesized in the early nineteenth century and 
its pesticidal virtues had been discovered in laboratories 
in UK and France during the early 1940s.36 
Juan Gomeza knew of these developments but he 
claimed that the discovery was “exclusively due to Span-
ish research, whose chemists are beginning to revolution-
ize the national industry, with total independence of the 
work [in other countries]”. According to his account, after 
the synthesis of the new product, experiments were carried 
out at the Madrid Phytopathological Station by Miguel 
Benlloch; Álvaro Lozano Morales studied its applications 
in malaria control, Gonzalo Piédrola in military hygiene, 
and the entomologist Gil Collado studied its potential 
uses in disinfestation of cattle (Gomeza Ozámiz, 1945; 
Lozano Morales, 1945; Fernández Astasio, 2003, pp. 365-
366; Rodríguez Ocaña et al., 2003, pp. 294-295; Andrés 
Turrión, 2019, pp. 187-188). The new product was soon 
authorized and included in the pesticide register, just after 
the first DDT products. It was registered under the trade-
mark “Gelón” and was proudly presented in many publi-
cations as the “insecticida español 666” (Moreno Martín, 
1946). Priority claims were made during the following 
years; the developments in the UK and France were re-
viewed and the terminology was discussed (Piédrola Gil, 
1953a, 1953b). In the following years, a particular isomer 
of this compound, gamma-HCH or lindane, became one 
of the most popular Spanish pesticides, and a flourishing 
industry was established in Galicia, the Basque Country 
and northern Aragón. Lindane was to become notorious 
at the end of the twentieth century, due to the health risks 
and the environmental problems it caused (Vijgen et al., 
2006; Barberá Pertusa, 2018; Pérez, 2019).
NEW DISCOURSES ON PESTICIDES
The arrival of the new pesticides led to changes not 
only in the chemical industry, but also in the way pesticides 
were represented in public. In the earlier years, with the 
development of the new arsenical pesticides, agricultural 
engineers used three main themes in their campaigns. First, 
they applied their common rhetoric of costs and benefits 
to other aspects of crop yields. By performing controlled 
field experiments or gathering data from their campaigns, 
they provided quantitative data showing the differences 
between the economic damage caused by insects and the 
price of pesticides. The economic balance was presented 
as convincing evidence of the advantages of investing in 
pesticides and equipment. Of course, these calculations did 
not take into account collateral costs such as farmworkers’ 
diseases, public health risks and environmental problems 
(Pimentel and Lehman, 1993, pp. 47-84; Murray, 1994). 
Other common topoi were military metaphors: pest con-
trol campaigns and human wars were presented in similar 
terms, with references to invasions, contention, troops, 
weapons, annihilation, and so on. This language was in fact 
an expression of deeper connections between warfare and 
the pesticide industry regarding its products, technologies, 
expert communities and potential markets (Russell, 2001). 
In the early years of the Franco regime, Spanish politicians 
commonly spoke about the war against the communist 
plague, while agriculture engineers appealed to nationalist 
sentiment and dreams of modernity in order to support the 
use of pesticides; reluctant farmers were portrayed as self-
ish and unpatriotic individuals whose backward and ineffi-
cient methods had no place in the renewed Spanish state. 
Finally, the rhetoric of autarky stressed the connections be-
tween the arsenic mines in northern Spain and the emerg-
ing pesticide industry, so many advertisements highlighted 
that the products were made with Spanish natural resources 
(Bertomeu Sánchez, 2020). 
With the arrival of new pesticides, some of these 
themes continued to be used and at the same time new im-
ages gained momentum. Following the trend of previous 
years, military metaphors were frequently found in adver-
tisements for pesticides, and descriptions of pest control 
activities were also used to express political messages. In 
the advertisement published by Agumar retailers, pesti-
cides such as arsenates, Bordeaux mixtures and DDT 
were depicted as motorized troops moving along a road 
on the way to wage war against pests in different villag-
es.37 And in an article published just after the award of the 
Nobel Prize to Paul Müller, the journalist offered a critical 
review of US international policy against communism un-
der the title of “Truman’s political DDT”:
Mr Truman believes, with the votes of the 23 million 
Americans who renewed his presidential mandate behind 
him, that the best anti-communist DDT is democracy. In 
the coming months, a powerful diplomatic and econom-
ic initiative is to be expected from Washington to spread 
this magic formula. Just now, Dr Paul Müller from Basel 
has received the Nobel Prize for his chemical DDT. We 
hope that Mr Truman will soon be awarded a Nobel Peace 
Prize for his political DDT. It’s a difficult adventure, and 
we disillusioned Europeans are rather sceptical. But he’s 
going to try.38 
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The sociomaterial features of the new organochlorine 
pesticides provided rhetorical resources for new discours-
es and imaginaries depicting their virtues and risks. In 
the beginning, the different uses of DDT in agriculture, 
public health and domestic contexts encouraged the emer-
gence of specific trademarks created by the companies 
and campaigns addressed at the target customers. For in-
stance, Geigy created “Gesarol” (agriculture), “Neocid” 
(anti-parasites), “Neocidol” (for the disinfection of cat-
tle) and “CAM” for domestic use. In each case, gendered 
images were used: women were depicted cleaning homes 
with “CAM” insecticides, while male farmers and scien-
tists appeared in the adverts for the other products.39 Oth-
er industries followed similar commercial strategies. Cruz 
Verde produced not only insecticides but also soap and 
colognes with DDT, and their adverts were also addressed 
to “mothers” who were “eager [to protect] the cleanliness 
and health of their children”.40 
Moreover, the uses of DDT during the Second World 
War introduced new possibilities for associating the war 
on pests in agriculture with action against annoying in-
sects in the home and with large-scale public health cam-
paigns for the eradication of typhus and malaria. The new 
products were presented as sources of economic profit, 
health and comfort to humankind (Vail, 2012). Geigy in-
dustries published many adverts for their different prod-
ucts while noting that “Swiss chemists had discovered 
the DDT insecticide, adopted by armies and by health 
and agricultural authorities all over the world”.41 Arsenic 
products had also been used in the past against Anoph-
eles mosquitoes and for the disinfection of cattle, but 
their high toxicity ruled out their use for humans in pub-
lic health and domestic contexts. One of the main ideas 
repeated in the advertisements in the mid-1940s was the 
innocuous nature of the new organochlorine compounds 
such as DDT. Many advertisements insisted on this point 
in 1945—in stark contrast to the prudence expressed by 
agricultural engineers in their first reports discussed in 
previous sections. The tensions can be perceived in the 
following example. When Benjamin García Milà of “Cruz 
Verde” submitted the application for registering its DDT 
pesticide in mid-September 1945, he included examples 
of leaflets and advertisements declaring, in large letters 
“¡No es venenoso!” (It isn’t poisonous!). One of them was 
addressed to farmers: 
Farmers, to combat the potato beetle, the beet flea and the 
alfalfa worm, use Cruz Verde Agricultural Insecticide—
Dichloro Diphenyl Tricoloroethane. You’ll increase your 
yield and protect your family too. Good for you and good 
for your livestock. Because Cruz Verde is not poisonous—
it doesn’t contain arsenic.42
In his positive report, Miguel Benlloch recommended 
the rapid registration of the product but he asked for the 
claims regarding the safety of DDT to be qualified and for 
more accurate information about its virtues. He suggested 
reformulations, such as “it is not poisonous at the recom-
mended doses” or “harmless at the applied doses.”43 Other 
problems of DDT (such as insect resistance, damage to 
beneficial insects or toxicity to mammals) were discussed 
very early on by doctors and agriculture engineers.44 
Agrochemical advertising for DDT and HCH (not just 
the campaigns launched by Cruz Verde), continued to use 
adjectives such as “efficient”, “productive”, “innocuous”, 
and “non-poisonous” in their slogans. Another particular 
feature of DDT highlighted in the advertisements was its 
lack of taste, which meant that it did not alter the flavour 
of the produce. This had been a major problem for HCH 
before the isolation of lindane, its gamma isomer.45 
Another common trope in the advertisements was the 
progress achieved by science in both agriculture and pub-
lic health. The new organochlorine products were present-
ed as the result of scientific research, and images of labo-
ratories, instruments and scientists featured frequently in 
the adverts. No such images had been found in advertise-
ments for earlier products such as arsenical pesticides or 
the popular Bordeaux mixture which focused on farmers, 
plants or insects and included texts asking for rapid action 
against the pest. In contrast, DDT was presented as the re-
sult of scientific progress; the advertisements sometimes 
included specialist terminology (such as “isomers”) or ac-
ademic-like reports.46 
An important concern was the quality of the DDT 
mixtures, an issue raised both by agricultural engineers 
and by political authorities. Due to their domestic and 
medical properties, organochloride pesticides were in-
cluded in the register of pharmaceutical drugs, so their 
quality was monitored by the pharmaceutical inspectors 
and they were on sale in pharmacies. However, the main 
concern was the control of quality in terms of efficien-
cy.47 Many advertisements referred to this issue by reject-
ing “fake” or “adulterated” products and presenting the 
“real” and “effective” DDT mixture, which was obtained 
in the company’s laboratories. Geigy in particular used 
this approach, presenting its products as the “real” DDT 
created by its discoverers;48 the firm published short ac-
counts of the discovery at the “laboratories J. R. Geigy”, 
suggesting that their products were the “original and le-
gitimate DDT”.49 In other cases, DDT was presented as 
“the triumph of modern Swiss chemistry”, the result of 
“more than ten years” of research made by “a team of 
65 researchers” at Geigy, thus “yielding a great service to 
humankind”.50 Geigy industries and their collaborators in 
Spain such as Irga and Laboratorios Padró in Barcelona 
also celebrated the Nobel Prize awarded in 1948 to Paul 
Müller, who was described as “director of the Geigy re-
search laboratories”.51
Countering these claims, Spanish firms also present-
ed their products as the results of their own scientific re-
search, and to this end registered their own trademarks 
such as “ZZ” and “Detano”. In press reports they stated 
that many organochlorine compounds (including DDT) 
had been synthesized in the nineteenth century, thus 
stressing the idea that “current science is based on past 
research”, that is to say, organochloride pesticides were 
far from being an isolated and exceptional discovery in a 
remote Swiss laboratory, but the result of collective sci-
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entific progress. Expanding on this idea, FAES published 
several advertisements depicting a chemical textbook 
with instruments and chemical formulae, with the slogan 
“Chemistry is an open book within the reach of every-
one”. They presented their own product (“Detano”) as 
the “true and real” DDT, obtained and patented by them-
selves.52 The different DDT products were advertised as 
the result of research in Spanish laboratories. In March 
1945, Zeltia announced that “Spain would soon benefit 
from a dramatic wartime discovery” without “waiting for 
peace”. “All the modernity and efficacy of DDT” would 
be “scientifically” captured in a new insecticide produced 
in Spain (“de elaboración nacional”) and sold under the 
tradename “ZZ”. Zeltia claimed to be producing the new 
insecticide in more intensive ways in order to cover the 
national demand in agriculture and public health.53
Presenting organochlorines as homegrown products in 
pesticide advertisements was a way to mobilize patriotic 
feelings and national pride, so characteristic of Francoist 
politics. Slightly earlier, in tune with the autarky discourse 
of the 1940s, it had been arsenic pesticides that were 
proudly presented as products of exclusively “national 
resources”. Now, with the advent of the new organochlo-
rine pesticides, advertisements and the agronomic litera-
ture spoke of “national research” rather than of “national 
resources”. HCH, for example, was praised as a Spanish 
discovery developed at Zeltia’s laboratories, not just in 
advertisements but in chemical and agricultural journals.54 
When Cruz Verde managed to produce lindane (an isomer 
of HCH), the firm also hailed it as “a new achievement of 
Spanish industry”.55 
Moving away from the rhetoric of autarky, and reinter-
preting patriotism in scientific terms, the new organochlorine 
pesticides were also presented in connection with the Franco 
regime’s national and international policies in the mid-1940s. 
Some industries enlisted the support of rural organizations 
(“Hermandades de labradores”) in order to advertise their 
products, which were also distributed with the help of the 
Francoist unions and the agricultural engineers. For instance, 
included in their advertisements Cruz Verde letters signed by 
the president of the Hermandades de Labradores confirming 
the efficacy of DDT in pest control: the letter finished with 
the standard Falangist motto “Por Dios, España y su Revolu-
ción Nacionalsindicalista (For God, Spain, and the National 
syndicalist revolution)”.56 
DDT arrived just as the newspapers were reporting the 
final victory of the Allied armies over the Fascist govern-
ments of Germany and Italy, two of Franco’s most im-
portant international allies during the Civil War and the 
early 1940s. In fact, the mid-1940s were bleak years for 
the emerging authoritarian regime due to its international 
isolation after the Second World War. In 1946, the Gen-
eral Assembly of United Nations excluded the Franco 
government from international organizations and confer-
ences. The regime adopted several measures to overcome 
these obstacles with propaganda campaigns and new 
movements in international policy. Presented as one of 
the tools in the victory of Allied armies, DDT was a good 
resource for implementing new discourses that praised the 
modern technologies of the US. Reports published in the 
press in 1945 highlighted the role of DDT in the victory of 
the Allied armies, for instance, in the fight against terrible 
locust swarms in north Africa or in the campaign against 
typhus in Naples.57 Several articles were published on the 
Peronist government in Argentina, which was helping the 
Spanish government against international isolation, and 
was pioneering aerial DDT fumigations with the help of 
US technologies.58 After the Japanese capitulation, news-
papers reported DDT fumigations carried out by the US 
army against “germ-bearing insects”.59 
Summing up, talking about DDT in the mid-1940s in 
Spain presented an opportunity to praise the achievements 
of the international allies of the new regime and to move 
away from the embarrassing connections to the Fascist 
regimes, which had been defeated thanks in part to the 
scientific achievements during the war: penicillin, radar, 
the atom bomb and DDT.60 The new organochlorine mix-
tures were presented as efficient and harmless to plants 
– and, unlike arsenates, as safe and non-poisonous to hu-
mans and livestock. After 1945, agrochemical advertising 
flooded not just newspapers but agriculture magazines 
as well, where it appeared alongside agronomic reports 
and guidelines and recommendations offered by agricul-
ture engineers. Thanks to the increasing demand, organ-
ochlorine pesticides offered new connections between 
scientific research and patriotic feeling, in tune with the 
programmes for pest control developed by agriculture en-
gineers and the new policies promoted by the Francoist 
regime after 1945.
CONCLUSIONS
The above discussion sheds new light on the emer-
gence of the Spanish pesticide industry during the first 
decade of the Franco regime. The process was complex 
and affected by many factors, including the old and new 
sociomaterial products used in pest control, a broad range 
of human and non-human protagonists, and changing 
economic policies and discursive practices. At the start of 
the period, the early 1940s, the large-scale use of arsen-
ical pesticides was aimed at fighting the spread of a new 
pest, the Colorado beetle, and encouraged the develop-
ment of Spain’s agrochemical industries in the context of 
the autarky policies of Franco’s early governments. The 
shortage of agrochemicals due to the wartime crisis, the 
restrictions on international trading, and the discovery 
of arsenic ores in northern Spain were additional issues 
that shaped the early years of the Spanish pesticide in-
dustry. Moreover, agricultural engineers supported the 
mass use of pesticides as the sole form of pest control 
in those years. This reductionist, simplistic approach to 
pest management and disease control was in tune with the 
regime’s policy on self-sufficiency regarding the use of 
natural resources and the interests of the emerging agro-
chemical industry. Moreover, pest control campaigns also 
served in to the surveillance of rural areas and the making 
of a centralized economy, which formed the basis of the 
authoritarian, Fascistoid regime in its initial stages. 
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Thus, regarding pest control at least, the first years of 
the Franco regime can hardly be portrayed as a “techno-
logical blackout”. On the contrary, substantial technolog-
ical innovations were introduced as the new authoritarian 
state sought to establish itself in the early 1940s. In spite 
of the oppressive political atmosphere, the mass introduc-
tion of arsenical pesticides faced resistance from farmers, 
hunters and other silenced voices, which were answered 
by multimedia campaigns sponsored by industry and ag-
ricultural engineers along with acts of political repres-
sion. In the discursive realm, images of economic profit 
achieved by means of pesticides and military metaphors 
in the fight against pests were intermingled with patriotic 
feeling and depictions of the Fascist-like modernity pro-
moted by the Franco regime. 
The arrival of the new organochlorine products sub-
stantially changed this scenario in mid-1940s, just when 
the regime found itself facing international isolation and 
obliged to reconsider its domestic and international pol-
icies. Without entirely replacing previous pesticides, 
the new products started to be used in agriculture, pub-
lic health and homes. At the same time, agricultural en-
gineers and doctors studied their efficiency and toxicity 
and attempted to control their quality by means of chem-
ical tests. Without waiting for the results of the research, 
a broad range of producers and retailers started to sell 
the new products in 1945, in spite of the calls for pru-
dence from experts. In contrast with arsenical pesticides, 
the new products did not depend on the natural resourc-
es available; they could be synthesized in laboratories. 
These sociomaterial features of organochlorine pesticides 
opened up a new spectrum of uses and created new dis-
cursive practices. DDT and other similar products were 
marketed in a way that praised their safety and health ben-
efits, but also appealed to the patriotic pride of the poten-
tial buyers. Spanish firms, the campaign went, were at the 
forefront of scientific progress, discovering new products 
and successfully synthesizing the new pesticides in their 
industrial laboratories. The new organochlorine pesticides 
also provided a rhetorical device for establishing connec-
tions with the regime’s new international allies such as 
Argentina and the US. 
The changes in the mid-1940s also affected the groups 
involved in the production and distribution of organochlo-
rine pesticides. New problems of quality control, fraud 
and adulteration emerged and encouraged new research 
on chemical tests. Quality control was the main focus 
of the new regulations published in the 1940s, which 
largely overlooked the problems of public health, occu-
pational diseases, and ecological damage caused by the 
pesticides, even though these problems had already been 
pointed by agriculture engineers and doctors. The toxic 
risks of pesticides were concealed, and responsibility for 
their effects was passed onto the farmworkers and rural 
communities; consideration of the longer-term impact on 
food consumers and ecological systems was ignored. The 
greatest profits were obtained by the big landowners, who 
obtained increased crop yields, at least in the first years; 
by the agrochemical industries, which reaped the benefits 
of an expanding market for their products, and not only in 
agriculture; and by the Francoist government, which was 
presented with a set of economic and discursive practices 
that were in tune with its domestic and international poli-
cies and also represented a useful way of controlling rural 
areas. This imbalance also encouraged undone science 
(the marginalization of other existing methods for pest 
control) and agnotology (the silencing of critical voices 
through discursive and repressive measures along with 
the flood of propaganda and advertising). With the help 
of the agricultural engineers, this unequal distribution 
of risks and benefits became the norm in the 1940s and 
shaped the further development of the Spanish pesticide 
treadmill during the decades to come. We have shown that 
the arrival of new pesticides such as DDT and HCH was 
moulded by this multifaceted context, which in turn was 
substantially changed by the sociomaterial features of the 
new products. 
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NOTES
1 See Bertomeu Sánchez (2019a).
2 The master narrative including these ingredients is Simpson 
(1997). On the use of pesticides in Spain at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, see the data provided by Eurostat in 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/
DDN-20181015-1 (accessed 12, 28, 2018).
3 See Pujol (2001). 
4 On Fascism and agriculture see Fernández Prieto, Pan-Monto-
jo and Cabo, 2014, pp. 19-43. In tune with this work and Saz 
(2004), we used the term “Fascistized regime” to refer to the 
Fascist ingredients in the early Francoist policies as well as to 
the process of Fascistization of right groups and traditional eli-
tes. Needless to say, the difficulty of defining “Fascism” is one 
of the most common issues in both contemporary accounts (e.g., 
Ortega y Gasset’s famous texts) and historical scholarship such 
as the classic books by Griffin (1993) and Paxton (2005). See 
also Costa Pinto (2012).
5 Some examples of this blossoming literature on science and 
technology in the Francoist regime are Camprubí (2017); 
Gorostiza (2017); Néstor and Roqué (2013); Nieto-Galan 
(2019); Swyngedouw (2015). See also papers included in this 
volume.
6 The issue has been recently discussed by Martín Albaladejo and 
Sanchiz (2017). The authors adopted an approach very diffe-
rent from the one adopted here. We particularly disagree with 
the claim that “entomology, as it was practiced at the time, was 
a zoological discipline engaged in taxonomic and faunistic re-
search, with no industrial or economic relevance” (p. 336).
7 For examples of the complex relationships between modernism 
and Fascism, see Griffin (2007), Bonneuil and Thomas (2010) 
and Fernández-Prieto, Pan-Montojo and Cabo (2014). On other 
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“Francoist engineers” see Camprubí (2017) and Swyngedouw 
(2015).
8 The relevance of Colorado beetles in the emergence of British 
pest control services is also remarked by Clark, (2009). See also 
Cook, (1998); Whorton, (1974).
9 See reports on pest control in different areas of Spain in the 
series Agricultura (61), Archivo General de la Administración 
(hereafter cited as AGA). See Alfaro Moreno, (1945).
10 “Orden de 11 de mayo de 1944 sobre medios de defensa contra 
la plaga del escarabajo de la patata”, BOE, 15 May, 1944, 3892-
2803. See also Agricultura, 1944, 13 (145): 340-435.
11 Hoja Oficial del Lunes, 18 June 1945. See another example in 
Diario de Burgos, 21 July 1944.
12 Diario de Burgos, 18 May 1944, 1. Order signed in Burgos, 
17 May 1944 by Manuel Yllera García-Lago, a leading Fran-
coist politician who organized a campaign of violent repression 
against the political opposition in Burgos. On his role in censor-
ship, propaganda and newspapers see Sanz (2016). 
13 See, for example, Andrés Turrión (2019, pp. 183-184): “No 
había – ni en España, ni en el resto del mundo- debate público 
sobre sus efectos adversos. Solo a lo largo de la década de 1960, 
tras la publicación en 1962 de la obra Silent Spring de Rachel 
Carson, se inició un largo y lento proceso de concienciación 
pública y debate conservacionista”. For a review of new studies 
on Carson see Pérez (2017). 
14 Reliable statistical sources on production and usage are lacking, 
but some numbers and trends are offered in González de Moli-
na, Soto and Guzmán (2020, pp. 94-97). We are grateful to prof. 
Ignacio Suay-Matallana for information on this recent publica-
tion. 
15 “[DDT] tiene una acción comparable apara los adultos, da en 
el agua suspensiones acuosas de gran estabilidad que permi-
ten hacer pulverizaciones uniformes, y no parece tóxico para 
los animales de sangre caliente a las concentraciones corriente 
empleadas en el tratamiento de las plantas. Su precio de cos-
te resulta algo alto, y lo limitado del tiempo en que se viene 
usando no nos ha permitido comprobar si, como se asegura, sus 
condiciones insecticidas permanecen inalterables al envejecer el 
producto”. Cf. (Alfaro Moreno, 1944, pp. 35-36).
16 Benlloch presented his results at the first International Confer-
ence on Phytopharmacy, which took place in Heverlee-Louvain 
(Belgium) in September 1946. See Benlloch (1945a).
17 Informaciones (1944) “… Nuevos insecticidas”. Agricultura 13, 
375-376.
18 Informaciones (1945) “… El nuevo insecticida D.D.T y sus 
similares”, Agricultura 14, 82.
19 We are grateful to Prof. Àlvar Martínez-Vidal for providing us 
with these valuable data.
20 BOE, 4 September 1940, (Order 13 August 1940). See Agricul-
tura 9 n. 96 (1940, pp. 137-139).
21 Jas, “Public Health and Pesticide Regulation” pp. 375-377.
22 “Decreto de 19 de septiembre de 1942 sobre fabricación y 
comercio de insecticidas, anticriptogamicidas y material de 
aplicación”, BOE, 23 October 1942, 8479-78. For previous at-
tempts see also BOE, 9 April 1941.
23 Confidencias… (1947), p. 164.
24 Dirección General de Agricultura, 1953, includes data until the 
end of 1952.
25 Benlloch (1951). 
26 Dirección General de Agricultura, 1953, pp. 4-5. 
27 Confidencias… (1947).
28 Anuncio - ZZ Producto de la serie D.D. T. (Insecticida Zeltia), 
1945. Agricultura 14, p. 259. See Pesticide Register numbers 
81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 222, 223, 376 and 380. Many advertisements 
were published in Agricultura after May 1945.
29 ABC, 3 June 1945, p. 36.
30 See Pesticide Register n. 100-101. Advertisements in Agricul-
tura, 15 (176): 658, December 1946 and in the general press 
as “Unicolor S.A.”: Diario de Burgos 23 April 1946; Imperio, 
Diario de Zamora de Falange Española de las J.O.N.S, 2 May 
1948; etc.
31 See Pesticide Register n. 320. Many advertisements were pub-
lished in Agricultura after the beginning of 1946 and in the gen-
eral press: for instance, Nueva Alcarria, 9 March 1946, Diario 
de Burgos 22 March 1947, etc.
32 See Pesticide Register numbers 109, 136, 179, 180 and 306 for 
José Escorihuela Perelló; 111, 134, 168, 245 and 317 for Fran-
cisco Villanova Ibañez; and 113 for José Ramón Rivelles Talón. 
33 See Pesticide Register, n. 107. Advertisements for Gesarol were 
published in Agricultura after September 1945 and also in the 
general press, including full page images and texts in national 
newspapers (ABC, 12 May 1945, ABC, 10 June 1945, ABC, 11 
June 1946, etc.) or the local press (El Adelanto: Diario político 
de Salamanca, 21 August 1945; Diario de Burgos, 6 December 
1945, etc.).
34 “Números de registro que corresponden a los productos fitosani-
tarios españoles”, Madrid 24 Dec 1949. Published in BOE, 17 Jan 
1949.
35 See Pesticide Register numbers 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 
126, 127, 131, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140 and 327 for nicotine 
pesticides; 45, 173, 181, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 197, 206, 285, 
344, 348, 408 and 418 for copper salt pesticides and 185, 189, 
195, 199, 201, 272, 276, 279, 282, 283, 288, 294, 295, 341, 403, 
406, 407, 411, 412, 413, 415, 416 and 417 for sulfur pesticides. 
36 See Straumann (2005, p. 272). In France the research was devel-
oped by the chemist André Dupire. We are grateful to Prof. Sa-
bine Clark for the information on Imperial Chemical Industries 
and their research on HCH, a discovery which was presented in 
public by Dr. Roland Slade in March 1945. Relying on Oleza’s 
account, Andrés Turrión (2019) reviews the research developed 
by Insecticidas Cóndor, while adopting the narrative of the “dis-
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no. 214 (1950, p. 89). 
38 Lucientes, Francisco. ‘El D.D.T. Político de Truman’, La Van-
guardia, 7 October 1948. 
39 See El Adelanto, 28 May 1946 “Líbrese señora de bichos y mos-
cas con CAM”. Or Diario de Burgos, 30 May 1936. “Una limp-
ieza perfecta exige CAM”. And compare with Diario de Burgos, 
6 July 1946, “¡Agricultor! No arriesgues tus cosechas”.
40 ABC, 1 July 1947, p. 32. “¡Prevéngase! Una madre celosa de la 
limpieza y salud de sus hijos no olvida la fricción diaria de agua 
de colonia Cruz Verde”. The new DDT cologne and soap was 
supposed to offer protection against lice caused by contact with 
pets and people in schools, stadiums, buses, etc.
41 ABC, Madrid, 12 May 1945.
42 AGA, 61/6422, n. 472. V. also Agricultura 15, no. 170 (1946): 
334 and Nueva Alcarria, 9 March 1946.
43 AGA, 61/6422, n. 472. Report by Miguel Benlloch, 26 October 
1945, “En cuanto a la afirmación de que este insecticida como 
otros similares no son venenosos, que viene admitiéndose en 
la propaganda comercial, entendemos debería tenderse a irla 
sustituyendo por otras como la de “no es venenoso a las dosis 
aconsejadas” o “inofensivo a las dosis aplicadas” que se ajusta 
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